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The Exploitation of Bank Charges and Undermining of Consumer
Protection: Exploring the Realms of High-to-Low Check Posting

I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine a consumer has a checking account balance of
$126.02. The consumer writes four checks in the amounts of
$25.00, $13.00, $50.00, and $198.58.1 Although these checks are
presented to the bank for payment on the same day, the bank
debits the account first for the $198.58 check, which creates an
overdraft and triggers overdraft fees on all the checks remaining,
2
including three smaller checks. The consumer is confronted with
four dishonored checks and consequently overdraft fees for all
four accounts.3 If the checks had been posted from the lowest
amount to the highest amount, only the $198.58 check would be
dishonored and only one overdraft fee would be charged. This
predicament is not a conjecture for Scott Shepard, the plaintiff, in
Hill v. St. Paul Fed. Bank for Savings; this is the scenario which
allowed him to fully grasp the implications of high-to-low check
posting.4
Banks have the privilege of processing checks in a number
of ways.' For example, some banks process checks on a first-come,
first-serve basis, some reorder checks to create a check number
sequence, while others sequence checks in ascending amounts
(low-to-high). 6 During the mid-1990s, a consultant introduced
computer-processing capability that would allow banks to
automatically process checks from high to low, and as a result

1. Hill v. St. Paul Fed. Bank for Say., 768 N.E.2d 322,323 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See id.
5. Aruna Apte et al., The Impact of Check Sequencing on NSF (Not-Sufficient
Funds) Fees, 34(2) Interfaces 97, 97 (2004), available at www.math.washington.edu/
-billey/classes/honors.350/artices/Week.2.pdf.
6. Id. (First-come-first serve basis entails "the random order in which checks are
captured in a check-sorting machine.").
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increase their revenues arising from overdraft fees.7 High-to-low
posting has become prevalent over the course of the past decade.8
The majority of the biggest consumer banks employ high-to-low
sequencing policies at their branches.9 A study revealed that eight
of the ten largest banks operating in the U.S., "including
Citigroup, Bank of America, Wachovia, Chase, Wells Fargo,
HSBC, U.S. Bank, and SunTrust," process checks according to the
high-to-low method. 10 Over the past decade, numerous consumer
class actions have arisen challenging a bank's high-to-low posting
order on the premise that this method is not enforceable due to
claims such as unconscionable contracts, breaches of good faith
and fair dealing, and contracts of adhesion.
In May of 2008, the Federal Reserve Board proposed rules
that would prohibit financial institutions from participating in
12
unfair practices regarding overdraft services for deposit accounts.
This effort included researching effective disclosures that
consumers would be attentive to, comprehend, and utilize in their
decision making process." While the proposed rule was not
centered on transaction clearing practices, the Agencies (the
FDIC, Board, OCC, OTS, and NCUA) requested comments on
the effect of imposing a low-to-high posting order that would force
institutions to process smaller dollar items before larger dollar
amounts. Institutions would still have the option to utilize
alternative clearing orders, with the understanding that the
institution has disclosed the clearing practice to the consumer and
the consumer has assented to opt in. 14 With the exception of the
OCC regulation, the current law and practice falls within the
boundaries of state law. Therefore, the possibility of a federal
7. Mike Thomas, Litigation Challenges Bank's Check Processing Practice, SAN
ANTONIO Bus. J., July 27, 2001, available at http://sanantonio.bizjournals.com/san

antonio/stories/2001/07/30/story4.html.
8. Barbara Clark, Storm Clouds on the Horizon for High-to-Low Debit Posting,
17(6) CLARKS' BANK DEPOSITS AND PAYMENTS MONTHLY 1, 2 (2008).

9. Apte et al., supra note 5, at 97.
10. Edward Botti, Banking Strategy Increases NSF Fees, NACS MAGAZINE, Feb.

2007, available at http://www.nacsonline.com/NACS/Magazine/PastIssues/February
2007/Pages/default.aspx.
11. Clark, supra note 8, at 1.
12. Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, 73 Fed. Reg. 28,904 (May 19, 2008).
13. Id. at 28,905.
14. Id. at 28,907.
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regulatory effort by the federal bank regulators under the unfair
and deceptive acts and practices provision of the FTC Act to
change the current law and practice in this area would be a
monumental progression. 5
Part II of this Note discusses the implications of an
institution's business decision to implement a high-to-low posting
order. 16 Part III presents a legal analysis of the posting method,
with a discussion of regulations and authoritative sources that
courts embrace to uphold a bank's discretion with regard to
sequencing practices."
Part IV discusses deposit account
agreements and disclosure of posting practices, including
challenges to enforceability of these agreements. Part V analyzes
the agencies' low-to-high check posting proposal."
II. HIGH-TO-Low CHECK POSTING

A.

Effect on NSF Charges

The outcome of high-to-low posting strategies is an
increase in non-sufficient funds (NSF) and consumer fees.2° NSF
fees, return items fees, and overdraft protection fees directly affect
the sequencing strategy that banks opt to utilize as their scheme
for clearing checks.2 Studies have shown steady increases in bank
revenues due to the fees that banks receive for these charges. In
2002, a study by the Federal Reserve estimated that banks
operating in the U.S. annually returned approximately 300 million
checks out of a total of approximately 49.6 billion checks.22 In the
same year, the average NSF fee was $20.73 per returned check,
and U.S. banks collected approximately $6.2 billion per year in
total NSF fees. 23 In 2005, a Consumer Federation of America
15. See id. (Discussion of statutory authority under the
Commission Act to address unfair or deceptive acts or practices).
16. See infra Part II.
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part V.
20. Botti, supra note 10.
21. Id.
22. Apte et al., supra note 5, at 98.
23. Id.

Federal Trade
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survey estimated that the largest banks charged an average of
$28.57 for overdrafts.24 In 2007, the fees that banks received from
NSF fees, return items fees, and overdraft protection fee charges
were projected to constitute as much as eighty-eight percent of the
service charges on deposit accounts. 25 Furthermore, experts
estimated that these charges amounted to almost $50 billon for
financial establishments in 2007.26
Consumers are faced with inordinately high fees when they
Banks that employ the high-to-low
overdraw their accounts.
sequencing method typically "bounce from 12 to 24 percent more28
checks for lack of sufficient funds than other banks.,
Considering the enormity of the opportunity for banks to
maximize profits based on high-to-low sequencing, it should come
as no surprise that in 1999, NationsBank, which was taken over by
Bank of America in a 1998 merger, refused to change its check
sequencing strategy in response to a class-action suit, but instead
agreed to pay $9 million out of court versus entering the discovery
stage of the trial.29 Subsequent to the merger, Bank of America
continued to process checks from highest to lowest amount.3 °
B.

Banks' Justifications

Banks that use high-to-low check posting offer several
arguments in defense. First, banks acknowledge that high-low
sequencing offers increased NSF fee revenue and that a change in

24. Jean Ann Fox & Patrick Woodall, Overdrawn: Consumers Face Hidden
Overdraft Charges From Nation's Largest Banks, 28 (Consumer Federation of
America) (2005), available at www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/CFAOverdraftStudy
June2005.pdf (explaining that Banks are reluctant to disclose their processing order
to customers).
25. Botti, supra note 10.
26. Id. ("Keep in mind that some of these checks that turn up NSF would bounce
no matter when they were presented for payment, and the order of clearing would
provide no help whatsoever. But by controlling the presentment queue, banks know
that they can inflate this number. This creative system is pumping record money in
fees into banks at the expense of the unsuspecting public.").
27. Fox & Woodall, supra note 24, at 4.
28. Apte et al., supra note 5,at 98.
29. Id.
30. Pat Curry, NationsBank Settles Suit, CNNMONEY, Nov. 10, 1999, http://mon
ey.cnn.com/1999/11/10/banking/brm-checking.
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the existing rule would diminish their revenue stream.31 Second,
banks emphasize that high-to-low check posting facilitates uniform
practices within the banks and, therefore, advances more wellorganized procedures for a particular bank.32 Third, Banks have
taken into account the "deterrent effect" that a high-to-low
posting order will have on consumer habits.33 In essence, banks
argue that customers who habitually overdraw their account will
not be enticed to bank with institutions that employ high-to-low
check posting methods.34 This argument may lead one to ask: Do
consumers choose banks according to their check processing
orders? And if so, how can customers make an informed decision
about a bank's processing order when most banks do not disclose
this information?35 Furthermore, banks routinely allow their
consumers to overdraw bank accounts, so how can they justify high
fees to deter mishandling by customers?3 6 Fourth, banks have
speculated that the order of check posting has an effect on the
banks' placement in the market.37 Banks argue that uniform
procedures within the organization will enable staff members to
effectively educate consumers on the bank's polices when they are
asked to address overdraft procedures.38 Banks contend that this
consistency leads to efficient operations that will improve the
banks position in the market.3 9
Banks argue that consumers want their largest checks
posted first to help guarantee that important bills, such as
mortgage or insurance payments, are paid first.4° However, this
rationale seems illogical when a depositor has overdraft protection
and the bank is paying all overdrafts and charging an overdraft fee

31. Interpretive Letter #997 from Julie L. Williams, First Deputy Comptroller
and Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 3 (Apr. 15, 2002),
available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/aug04/int997.pdf).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Fox & Woodall, supra note 24, at 20.
36. Id. at 18.
37. Williams, supra note 31.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.; see also Fox & Woodall, supra note 24, at 17.
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on each item. If all items will eventually be paid, wouldn't the
depositor prefer low-to-high check posting so that the fewest
number of checks will be overdrafts, subjecting the consumer to
the fewest number of overdraft charges? 42 Furthermore, a 1998
public survey indicated that only 13% of respondents wanted
banks to process the largest checks since those may be the most
significant.43 Nearly two-thirds of consumers believed that banks
should pay checks in the order the bank receives them while 16%
felt that banks should pay the smallest checks first to curtail the
number of checks that are dishonored. 44 The justification that
high-to-low check posting ensures important payments are made is
a rationale that "can not justify this practice for banks that45
routinely honor overdrafts because all debits will get covered.,
Banks that continue to employ high-to-low sequencing are not
aligning their customers' "priorities and preferences" with their
order of posting; but, for all intents and purposes, are seeking to
maximize the imposition of overdraft fees.46
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A.

Pre-Code

Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC), courts granted banks the discretion to post checks in any
order the institution saw fit. 7 This principle can be traced back to
the early 1900S.4 1 In Reinisch v. Consolidate National Bank, with a
balance of roughly $328, the plaintiff simultaneously presented
seventeen checks totaling $664 and the account funds were
rendered insufficient. 49 The court held that the defendant bank
41. Clark, supra note 8.
42. Id.
43. Fox & Woodall, supra note 24, at 17.
44. Consumer Federation of America, Bounced Checks: Billion DollarProfits II
3 (1998) (Appendix reporting results of an Opinion Research Corporation
International poll of 1005 consumers).
45. Fox & Woodall, supra note 24, at 18.
46. Williams, supra note 3; see also Fox & Woodall, supra note 24.
47. See, e.g., Reinisch v. Consolidated Nat'l Bank, 45 Pa. Super. 236 (1911); see
also Castaline v. Nat'l City Bank, 244 Mass. 416 (1923).
48. Id.
49. Reinisch, 45 Pa. Super. at 237.
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439

had free range with regard to which check the institution could
post first.5 0 Under similar facts, the court held in Castaline v.
National City Bank that the "bank [had] the right to make
payment in any order it may decide, until the deposit is
exhausted. ""
B.

UCC 4-303

After the introduction of the UCC, courts across the nation
have cited its section 4-303 as enabling banks to implement highto-low posting order strategies. 2 Section 4-303 of the UCC states:
"items may be accepted, paid, certified, or charged . . . in any
order" contingent upon a "notice, stop-payment order, legal
process, or set-off."53 Official Comment 7 to UCC 4-303 reads:
As between one item and another no priority rule is
stated. This is justified because of the impossibility
of stating a rule that would be fair in all cases,
having in mind the almost infinite number of
combinations of large and small checks in relation to
the available balance on hand in the drawer's
account; the possible methods of receipt; and other
variables. Further, the drawer has drawn all the
checks, the drawer should have funds available to
meet all of them and has no basis for urging one
should be paid before another; and the holders have
no direct right against the payor bank in any event,
unless of course, the bank has accepted, certified or
finally paid a particular item, or has become liable

50. Id. at 243.
51. Castaline,244 Mass. at 416.
52. See, e.g., Security Trust Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 358 N.Y.S.2d 943, 947 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1974) (holding "the defendant's decision [regarding process of posting] was
proper procedure and at the convenience of the defendant bank and in compliance
with subdivision (2) of section 4-303 of the Uniform Commercial Code"); see also,
New Jersey Bank v. Palladino, 368 A.2d 943, 951 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)
(holding "The Uniform Commercial Code ... vests broad discretion in a bank to
allocate funds received to a customer's account in any order convenient to the
bank.").
53. U.C.C. § 4-303 (2005).
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for it under Section 4-302. Under subsection (b) the
it is itself
bank has the right to pay items for which
54
not.
is
it
which
for
those
of
ahead
liable
Courts have cited UCC 4-303 as the basis for rejecting
plaintiff arguments for breach of covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in response to posting policies.55 For example, in Hill v. St.
Paul Fed. Bank for Savings, the plaintiff challenged the defendant
bank's posting order sequence on the premise that high-to-low
posting simply accomplished the goal of maximizing bank fees
while illustrating an "improper motive" and infringing upon the
duty of good faith and fair dealing.56 The plaintiff argued that the
account agreement gave the bank the sole authority to choose a
posting order most beneficial to the institution and the
arrangement failed to align with the consumer's "reasonable
expectations."57 The court dismissed the claim of breach of
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and explained that
although disclosures were not made to consumers regarding
specific posting order methods, activities pursuant to UCC section
4-303(b) could not be deemed to lack good faith.58 The court
reasoned that the legislature contemplated the possibility that
banks could utilize high-to-low methods and consequently
subjecting consumers to an increased number of overdraft fees.5 9
Many states have adopted state provisions that parallel
UCC 4-303. 60 The Texas State Bar Committee suggests that it is
unlawful for a bank to implement a posting order strategy
exclusively for the purpose of gaining revenues from escalating
consumer fees.61 The State Bar Committee requires a showing of
61
good faith during this decision making process. Moreover, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), regulator of
54. Id.

App. Ct.
55. See, e.g., Hill v. St. Paul Fed. Bank for Sav., 768 N.E.2d 322, 323 (I11.
2002).
56. Id. at 325.
57. Id.

58. Id. at 328.
59. Id.
60. See, e.g, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.303 (2007).
61. Id.
62. Id.

HIGH-TO-LOW CHECK POSTING

2009]

national banks, notes that an essential element in accessing good
faith is a comparative analysis of the bank's presentation to
consumers versus the actual practices the institution has
implemented.63 In addition to section 4-303, the OCC listed 12
U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) and 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002 as controlling
authority that grants nationally chartered banks expansive
discretion with regard to posting order. 64 According to the OCC,
"Section 24(Seventh) authorizes a national bank to engage in
activities that are part of, or incidental to, the business of banking
as well as to engage in certain specified activities listed in the
statute.,65

Section

7.4002

establishes

that

"method[s]

of

calculating" are organizational determinations that resides within
the judgment of the bank: "A national bank may charge its
customers non-interest charges and fees ...The establishment of

non-interest charges and fees, their amounts, and the method of
calculating them are business decisions to be made by each bank,
in its discretion, according to 66sound banking judgment and safe
and sound banking principles.

Thus, as long as the standards of "safe and sound banking
principles" are met, the bank is allowed to follow a posting order
most beneficial to the institution. 6 Additionally, the regulation
sets forth essential elements that the institution should consider in
order to meet this standard including, but not limited to:
prevention of mishandling by consumers of services provided by
the bank, expenditures sustained by making the service available
to consumers, the enrichment of the "competitive position of the
bank in accordance with the bank's business plan and marketing
strategy; and [t]he maintenance of the safety and soundness of the
institution. ' 68 Moreover, in the preliminary statements of the
amended provisions, the OCC declared that the discretion for
posting order methods was pursuant to 12 C.F.R. § 7.4002.69

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Williams, supra note 31.
Id.
Id.
12 C.F.R. § 7.4002 (2009) (emphasis added).
Williams, supra note 31.
12 C.F.R. § 7.4002.
Williams, supra note 31.
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OCC Regulation and Interpretive Order

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
regulates national banks.7 ° State banks are regulated by the state's
banking regulator and receive federal oversight by the Federal
Reserve if the state bank is a member of the Federal Reserve
System and by the FDIC if the state bank is not a Federal Reserve
Board member.7 Pursuant to the National Banking Act, the OCC
has issued a regulation that authorizes national bank discretion in
the "method of calculating" bank fees, including overdraft fees.72
Furthermore, the preamble to the regulation when it was first
proposed, provided that "fees resulting from the method the bank
employs to post checks presented for payment are included within
the authorization provided by" the regulation.
An OCC
interpretive letter confirms that in the OCC's view a high-to-low
check posting order is consistent with the OCC regulation and the
National Bank Act.74 Moreover, since the OCC view and the state
law view under the UCC are consistent, there is no issue with
whether the OCC view preempts the state law on this issue.
IV. DEPOSIT ACCOUNT AGREEMENTS AND DISCLOSURE OF
POSTING PRACTICES

A.

Deposit Account Agreements

Since many consumers are uninformed of their bank's
processing order, the Federal Reserve noted in adopting Truth in
Savings regulations that consumers are unlikely to know the
quantity of items that will bounce, and consequently will be
unknowingly encumbered with fees.75 A Consumer Federation of
America (CFA) survey points out that depository institutions by
and large do not divulge the order they process debits and many

70. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, http://www.occ.treas.gov/
aboutocc.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2009).
71. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 321 (2008).
72. 12 U.S.C.A. 24(7) (2008).
73. 66 Fed. Reg. 34,784, 34,787 (Jul. 2, 2001).
74. Williams, supra note 31.
75. See Truth in Savings, 12 C.F.R. § 230.1 (2009).
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indicate that they can change their processing order without giving
For instance, Wachovia's "Deposit
notice to consumers.76
Agreement and Disclosures for Personal Accounts" reserves the
right to process debit items, namely checks or ATM withdrawals,
in the order determined by the bank and at any time may exercise
the right to change the processing order.77 Similarly, KeyBank
processes debit items in any order that it sees fit and also retains
the right to change the processing order without prior notice to the
depositor.7 8 "CFA found that nearly one fourth (24.2%) of banks
refuse to disclose any debit processing order beyond 'any order,'
one seventh (15.2%) of banks reserve the right to process debits in
any order but disclose they generally process debits from largest to
smallest; and one third (33.3%) disclose they process debits largest
to smallest."7' 9
The American Bankers Association (ABA) asserts that
processing orders are multifarious and intricate, making it
impracticable to explain the process in terms that consumers can
The ABA contends that an effort to inform
understand.80
consumers • of81 processing orders would call for several pages of
This sentiment that disclosure of posting orders
explanations.
would call for convoluted contractual terms was argued in Shelley
v. AmSouth Bank: "providing overly complicated or technical
disclosures to consumers provides little value in shopping for
accounts and may diminish the value of the information given...
regardless of how simple it would be to identify and explain a
posting order policy, it does not constitute information so
fundamental that Congress could not have sanctioned its nondisclosure. 8 2 Notwithstanding the fact that most banks do not
76. Fox & Woodall, supra note 24, at 17.
77. Wachovia "Deposit Agreement and Disclosures for Personal Accounts,"
effective October 1, 2008, http://www.wachovia.com/personal/onlineservices/
disclosure/view/0,,7,00.html.
78. KeyBank, "Deposit Account Agreement and Funds Availability Policy,"
effective December 10, 2004, Part 1,6. https://www.key.com/html/E-3.41.html.
79. Fox & Woodall, supra note 24, at 17.
80. Letter from Nessa Feddis, Senior Federal Counsel ABA, to Jennifer J.
Johnson, Secretary Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 6 (Aug. 6,
2004), available at http://files.ots.treas.gov/960298.pdf.
81. Id.
82. Shelley v. AmSouth Bank, No. Civ. A. 97-1170-RV-C, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS
11428 (S.D. Ala. July 24, 2000).
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release their processing order, some banks include as text in their
consumer account agreement disclosures that processing orders
can have an effect on total fees for consumers. 83 For example,
Bank of America informs their consumers that select processing
orders can produce additional insufficient funds fees. 84 Similarly,
Citizen's Bank "Personal Deposit Account Agreement" cautions
consumers that the bank's choice in how it processes checks may
increase the overdraft fees the consumer may have to pay."
B.

Challenges to Enforceability of DepositAccount
Agreements

Plaintiffs have presented various theories in a quest to
challenge banks' high-to-low posting order policies, contract terms,
and disclosures. Consumers have looked to state consumer
protection acts to fortify challenges against high-to-low posting
orders."6 The plaintiff in Smith v. First Union National Bank
asserted that high-to-low check posting was a transgression of
consumer rights and pointed to the Tennessee Consumer
Protection Act to support this contention.8 7 The purpose of that
act is "to protect consumers and legitimate business enterprises
from those who engage in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in
the conduct of any trade or commerce in part or wholly within
[Tennessee]."
Additionally, it seeks to "simplify, clarify, and
modernize state law governing the protection of the consuming
public and to conform these [respective] laws with existing
consumer protection policies. 8 9
The Act also includes an
exemption clause that states that the Tennessee act does not apply
to activities falling within the boundaries of the laws in Tennessee
83. Fox & Woodall, supra note 24, at 17.
84. Bank of America, "Deposit Agreement & Disclosures," effective Nov. 1,
2008,
https://www3.bankofamerica.com/efulfillmentODAO/newwindownp.cfm?
appURL=https://www3.bankofamerica.com/efulfillment/&showdaddoc=91-11-2000
ED&daddoc2use=20081101&type=l&view=htm.
85. Citizen's Bank, "Personal Deposit Account Agreement" October 2004, at 15.
86. See, e.g,, Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 958 S.W.2d 113 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1997).
87. Id. at 114.
88. Consumer Protection Act of 1977, TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-102 (2008).
89. Id.

20091
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or the United States.' The court held that the exemption clause
was applicable to the plaintiff's case and therefore, the Bank's
practice of high-to-low check posting was a legitimate strategy. 91
Plaintiffs have alleged contracts of adhesion with regard to
terms between banks and consumers. 9 A bank's discretion with
regard to posting orders may be outlined in standardized forms
that consumers may accept or decline, with no opportunity to
negotiate. For example, in response to disproportionate fees
charged to consumers for insufficient funds in checking accounts,
plaintiffs in Wallace v. National Bank of Commerce alleged that
deposit agreement terms presented to consumers were essentially
contracts of adhesion." The court framed this issue by suggesting
that if the arrangement between the banks and the consumers
created a contract of adhesion, the terms of the contract would not
be enforced if it was "unduly oppressive or unconscionable."' 94
Adhesion contracts have been defined as "standardized contract
form[s] offered to consumers of goods and services on essentially a
'take it or leave it' basis, without affording the consumer a realistic
opportunity to bargain."9 5 Although the court found that the use
of a standardized form and the "take-it-or-leave-it" predicament
that the consumer was placed in were elements of an adhesion
contract, these isolated components were not adequate to mount a
cause of action for contract adhesion.96
Theories of unconscionable conduct have been raised in
connection to high-to-low check posting.97 The plaintiff in Daniels
v. PNC Bank, N.A., asserted that the bank's efforts to maximize
profits by utilizing a high-to-low check sequencing amounted to
unconscionable actions. 8 In response to this allegation, the court
held that since high-to-low posting is authorized pursuant to 12
90. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-111 (2008).

91. Smith, 958 S.W.2d at 116-17.
92. See, e.g, Union Bank v. Ross, 126 Cal. Rptr. 646, 651 (Cal. App. 2d Dist.

1976).
93. Wallace v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 938 S.W.2d 684, 687 (Tenn. 1996).
94. Id.
95. Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 320 (Tenn. 1996) (citing Black's Law

Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)).
96. Wallace, 938 S.W.2d at 687.
97. See, e.g., Daniels v. PNC Bank, N.A., 738 N.E.2d 447 (Ohio Ct. App. 2000).
98. Id. at 451.
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C.F.R. § 7.40002(b), it cannot be deemed unconscionable.99
Moreover, the court suggested that the plaintiffs had the power to
conduct their financial affairs in a manner that would not render
their account funds as insufficient by merely refraining from
The court also addressed the
endorsing bad checks. °
consequences that may materialize from having insufficient funds
in your checking account and the preclusion of equitable reprieve:
"[A] person who chronically writes bad checks does not have clean
hands to seek equitable relief from the resulting fees, since such a
person is engaged in bad banking practices and is merely
experiencing the intended deterrent effect of those fees." ' '1 Since
customers will not be charged fees once they incorporate financial
habits that will enable them to maintain sufficient funds, the court
ruled that the power of self-discipline leads to a conclusion that
there is no achievable cause of action for unconscionability. 12
Plaintiffs have also argued that contractual terms defining
posting orders that are "convenient to the bank" can be misleading
In Daniels v. PNC Bank, N.A., the
and misinterpreted. 3
agreement between the bank and the plaintiff read: "If there are
sufficient funds to cover some but not all of your withdrawal
orders, we will allow those withdrawals that can be paid, in any
order convenient to us."' 4 The plaintiff asserted that the court
should declare the phrase "in any order convenient to us" as
imprecise or interpret the language to mean "'an outright promise
to pay all withdrawals in an ascending rather than descending
order."'0 5 In response to the plaintiff's argument that the language
was vague, the court held:
First, we do not perceive any ambiguity in the
language "we will allow those withdrawals that can

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
2000);
1997).
104.
105.

Id. at 452.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Daniels v. PNC Bank, N.A., 738 N.E.2d 447, 449 (Ohio Ct. App.
see also Smith v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 958 S.W.2d 113 (Tenn. Ct. App.
Daniels, 738 N.E.2d at 449 (emphasis added).
Id.
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be paid, in any order convenient to us." According
to [the plaintiff], the last clause, "in any order
convenient to us," is "nonsensical and renders the
majority of the statement a nullity." This is true,
however, only if one chooses to ignore the plain
meaning of the words and obvious construction of
the sentence. The words "in any order convenient
to us" are clearly intended to modify "withdrawals
that can be paid." As for the argument that these
words somehow constitute an "outright promise" to
pay the checks in an ascending order, we find this to
be the "nonsensical" construction/°6

Under similar facts, the court in Smith v. First Union
National Bank held that the judicial branch was not in the position
to delineate bank practices that were opportune for a particular
institution.0 7 The court employed judicial deference in connection
to the bank's internal operational judgments 108
and found the terms
"convenient to the bank" to be explicitly clear.
Plaintiffs have mounted causes of actions against banks for
failure to disclose high-to-low check posting guidelines. The
plaintiff in Shelley v. AmSouth Bank argued that a Bank's
disclosure of posting orders to consumers is imperative in order to
fulfill the standards set forth in the Truth in Savings Act.0 9 The
Truth in Savings Act requires "each depository institution ...[to]
maintain a schedule of fees, charges, interest rates and terms and
conditions applicable to each class of accounts offered by the
depository institution."' '1 The Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System is charged with detailing what items should be
disclosed."'
The Truth in Savings Act states that the schedule
should include a "description of all fees, periodic service charges,
and penalties which may be charged or assessed against the
account... the amount of any such fees, charge, or penalty (or the
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Smith, 958 S.W.2d at 116.
Id.
Shelley, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428 at *4.
Truth in Savings Act, 12 U.S.C.A. § 4303(a) (2008).
Shelley, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428 at *5-6.
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method by which such amount will be calculated), and the
conditions under which any such amount will be assessed." ' Since
the meaning of "conditions" is not stated in the statute, the
plaintiff attempted to fill in the gap by suggesting that "conditions"
should be construed to mean "a state of being" or "attendant
circumstances., 113 The plaintiff argued that the bank's high-to-low
posting sequence is a "condition" which will be assessed, and in
order to align with the principles set forth in the Truth in Savings
Act, the Bank is forced to disclose this policy."' The court held
that in order to uphold the requirements of the Truth in Savings
Act, the bank was not required to disclose its posting order
strategy."5 The court's rationale for this conclusion is based on the
premise that the Board has "publish[ed] several model forms and
clauses for common disclosures" which meet the standards of the
Truth in Savings Act.'16 Since none of these standardized forms
include posting order disclosures, the court reasoned that the
defendant bank is not obligated to disclose this information to
consumers. 117
In addition to the allegation of a Truth in Savings Act
violation, the plaintiff asserted a claim for fraudulent suppression
in connection to posting order policies."' To successfully bring a
claim of fraudulent suppression, an obligation to unveil the
suppressed information must be present. 9 The court dismissed
the fraudulent suppression claim based on the rationale that the
defendant bank was not required to divulge the institution's
posting order sequence.12
V.

ANALYSIS OF AGENCIES' LOW-TO-HIGH CHECK POSTING

112. 12 U.S.C.A. § 4303(b) (2008) (emphasis added).
113. Shelley, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428 at *6.
114. Id.
115. Id. at *12.
116. Id. at *8-9. ("[T]he Board is directed to publish model forms and clauses for
common disclosures, and a depository institution that uses such forms or clauses,
either unchanged or with changes that do not affect the substance, clarity, or
meaningful sequence of the disclosures, shall be deemed to be in compliance with the
disclosure provisions of [the] chapter, 12 U.S.C. § 4308(2).").
117. Id. at *9-10.
118. Id. at *21.
119. See General Motors Corp. v. Bell, 714 So. 2d 268, 280 (Ala. 1996).
120. Shelley, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11428 at *22.
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PROPOSAL

The Agencies' request for comments treats high-to-low
check posting as an unfair and deceptive act or practice. 12' This
treatment is significant because courts have consistently rejected
the claim that high-to-low posting methods is a violation under
state unfair and deceptive trade practice statutes. l2 For instance,
the plaintiff in Hill v. St. Paul Fed. Bank for Savings contended
that "the failure of [banks] to disclose their posting method was an
omission of a material fact in violation of the Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act ... [and] the failure to disclose

was deceptive under the Act.' ' 123 The Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act protects business transactions
and activities against parties engaging in deceptive conduct with
the intention of inducing others to rely on this deceptive
behavior.
The court held that the bank was not under an obligation to
disclose the institution's posting order strategy and therefore, no
omission or deceptive practice was found that constituted a
violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practice
Act."2 However, a federal agency attempt to specify a particular
posting order, or failure to give the consumer notice and
opportunity to opt-in, as an unfair and deceptive practice would
to be a reasonable agency interpretation of the
probably be found
126
federal statute.
There are potential advantages and disadvantages to
requiring a low-to-high posting. Low-to-high posting would enable
the fewest number of checks to be overdrafted and subject the
127
consumer to the fewest number of overdraft charges.
Additionally, as a matter of public policy, NSF fees may be a

121. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
122. See, e.g., Hill v. St. Paul Fed. Bank for Sav., 768 N.E.2d 322 (11. App. Ct.
2002).
123. Id. at 711.
124. Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
505/2 (2009).
125. Hill, 768 N.E.2d at 331.
126. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
127. See Clark, supra note 8, at 2.
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significant reason why many people who do not have checking
accounts rather pay an equivalent fee to check cashers 1 8 A lowto-high posting may encourage people to enter the banking system
and presumably, this would entice consumers to save and reduce
crime (by reducing the number of people carrying around cashed
paychecks). While many advantages may surface, it is important
to acknowledge that potential loss of significant fee income to
banks could be disastrous, especially in our current challenging
economic climate. 129
As it currently stands, many banks have deposit account
agreements with customers where they give various levels of
disclosures regarding their check-posting policies.13°
While
disclosure remains a problem, the most beneficial disclosure
appears to be banks that reveal to consumers that posting order
strategies can have an adverse effect on their accounts."' It is
important to consider that disclosure may become difficult if banks
adopt different orders in different circumstances.132 It may be
desirable to allow a bank to sometimes post high-to-low, and
sometimes post low-to-high.

33

For example, the bank may

normally utilize low-to-high sequencing in order to minimize NSF
fees for the consumer; however, if the consumer is repeatedly
bouncing checks, the bank may switch to the high-to-low method
to deter this habit.
The Agencies' request for comments suggests that an
alternative posting order (presumably high-to-low) would be
possible if the depositor "opts-in." ' 34 However, it would not be
beneficial for a depositor to be required to agree to a high-to-low
method in order to open an account."3
Thus, the logical
interpretation would be that the default option will be low-to-high
and that this posting order can be reversed only if the customer

128. See id.
129. See generally Williams, supra note 31.
130. See supra Part IV.
131. See, e.g., Bank of America, supra note 84; Wachovia, supra note 77.
132. See Clark, supra note 8.
133. See id.
134. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 20-30 (explaining the effect that high-to-low posting order has
on deposit accounts).
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specifically agrees.136 The Agencies' proposal to ask for an "optin" by the consumer to any policy other than low-to-high may
undermine the accomplishment of the rule since most banks are
likely to require an opt-in to a different posting order regime.'37
VI. CONCLUSION
High-to-low posting only accomplishes the goal of
maximizing the bank's fee income."' The nature of high-to-low
posting is seemingly an unfair and deceptive trade practice that
aims to only capitalize on mistakes by consumers. 9 Analysis of
the claims presented in consumer class actions challenging a bank's
high-to-low posting of checks and electronic debits reveal that
customers feel
they
dec • d 140
cusomes
heyar
fel are being
beng wrongfully
ronfulyaeceived.
The
established nature of high-to-low posting orders accomplishes the
goal of maximizing bank fee
income at the expense of
• .• 141
safeguarding consumer protection.
Regulators have analyzed
the recommendations presented by the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS), the primary regulator of federal thrifts, and
have presented proposals surrounding the bank's high-to-low
check posting practices. 142 The proposal presents inquiries into
implementing a new strategy for institutions: "Agencies solicit
comment on the impact of requiring institutions to pay smaller
dollar items before larger dollar items when received on the same
day for purposes of assessing overdraft fees on a consumer's
account., 143 It is unlikely that a dramatic shift from high-to-low
sequencing will surface soon. Comments regarding the established
practice will most likely be considered first, and then a formal
rulemaking on this issue may be presented. Enacting a mandatory
"low-to-high" posting order would discontinue the practice of

136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
Id.
See Clark, supra note 8, at 1.
See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 86-120 and accompanying text.
See Clark, supra note 8, at 1.
Unfair or Deceptive Acts and Practices, 73 Fed. Reg. at 28,933.
Id. (emphasis added).
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undermining consumer protection by reducing the amount of
overdraft fees that are incurred by consumers. 44

WILLIE

144. See supra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
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